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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Before the Court is an application by Hess Oil Virgin 
Islands Corporation (“HOVIC”) for an extension of time to 
file a petition for a writ of certiorari from a decision of the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.  Our rules provide that 
an extension of the sixty-day period in which to file a 
certiorari petition may be granted “for good cause shown.”  
3d Cir. Local Appellate Rule (“LAR”) 112.4(a) (2010).  
HOVIC seeks an additional thirty days to file its petition on 
the ground that it recently retained counsel to represent it 
before this Court, and counsel contends that he cannot meet 
the current deadline, mainly due to other professional 
commitments.  For the reasons explained below, I conclude 
that HOVIC’s grounds for seeking an extension of time do 
not amount to “good cause.” However, because this court has 
not previously addressed standards applicable to the showing 
required under LAR 112.4(a), I will grant HOVIC’s request 
for an extension of time. 
I. 
 I need not recount the nature of the dispute between 
HOVIC and the respondent, Pierre P. Joseph, for purposes of 
addressing this extension request.  Briefly stated, HOVIC 
intends to file a certiorari petition from a decision of the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands entered March 8, 2011.  
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The Supreme Court reversed an order in which the Superior 
Court of the Virgin Islands granted summary judgment in 
HOVIC’s favor, and it remanded to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings.  According to HOVIC, the parties agreed 
to settle the case shortly before the Supreme Court issued its 
March 8 decision.  HOVIC moved to recall the mandate or 
for leave to file a petition for rehearing out of time, citing the 
purported settlement.  The Supreme Court denied both 
requests.  HOVIC maintains that the case became moot once 
the parties agreed to settle, and it intends to seek certiorari to 
argue, inter alia, that mootness deprived the Supreme Court of 
jurisdiction to issue the March 8 decision.  
 A petitioner may seek review in this Court “of a final 
decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands … by 
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari … within 60 days from 
the entry of judgment sought to be reviewed[.]”  LAR 
112.2(a) (emphasis added); see also Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r 
of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Under 48 U.S.C. § 
1613, the Third Circuit has temporary certiorari jurisdiction 
over final decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.”).  
For purposes of adjudicating the present motion, I will 
assume that the March 8 decision is a “final decision,” and 
therefore one that would fall within the scope of this Court’s 
jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613 if a timely certiorari 
petition were filed.  As such, HOVIC’s sixty-day period to 
file a certiorari petition in this matter expired on Monday, 
May 9, 2011.1  HOVIC filed its application for an extension 
                                                 
1   The sixtieth day actually fell on May 7, 2011, which was a 
Saturday.  While our local rules do not specify a method for 
computing the last day for filing a petition for a writ of 
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of time on May 3, six days prior to the due date.  HOVIC asks 
for an extension of thirty days, until June 8.2   
 HOVIC contends that it needs more time because it 
retained appellate counsel “to advise it of its procedural 
options and to represent it before this Court only a few weeks 
ago.”3  Appellate counsel notes that the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
certiorari, “[t]he Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the 
extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory 
provisions or these [local] rules, may be applied to a 
proceeding seeking a writ of certiorari.”  LAR 112.14(a).  
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(a) governs the 
computation of “any time period specified … in any local rule 
… that does not specify a method of computing time.”  Rule 
26(a) is not inconsistent with LAR 112.2(a) and applies here.  
“When the period is stated in days … include the last day of 
the period, but if the last day of the period is a Saturday, … 
the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is 
not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”  Fed. R. App. P. 
26(a)(1)(C).  Accordingly, HOVIC’s last day on which to file 
a certiorari petition was Monday, May 9, 2011.   
 
2   HOVIC subsequently submitted its proposed certiorari 
petition for filing on June 8, and our Clerk entered an order 
holding the petition in abeyance pending disposition of the 
application for an extension of time.   
 
3   HOVIC was represented before the Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands by counsel based in St. Croix.  That same 
counsel is listed on the application for an extension of time, 
along with HOVIC’s recently added appellate counsel, Peter 
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denied the motion to recall the mandate on April 28, 2011, 
and “the analysis contained in that order must be addressed in 
any petition that is to be filed.”  Finally, appellate counsel 
asserts that he had competing obligations prior to the due date 
for HOVIC’s certiorari petition, including the filing of a 
petition for rehearing and an extension request in other cases.  
In addition, on the Thursday and Friday before the Monday 
on which the certiorari petition was due, counsel had 
commitments to the Third Circuit Bar Association and Third 
Circuit Judicial Conference, including an appearance as a 
panelist at a Judicial Conference meeting.   
II. 
 Congress has provided that, for the first fifteen years 
following establishment of the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals “shall have 
jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari all final decisions 
of the highest court of the Virgin Islands from which a 
decision could be had.”  48 U.S.C. § 1613.  Congress also has 
conferred upon this Court “jurisdiction to promulgate rules 
necessary to carry out the provisions of [§ 1613].”  Id.  
Consistent with this mandate, we adopted local rules in 2007 
to govern practice and procedure in the exercise of our 
certiorari jurisdiction.4  See LARs 112.1-14.  Among other 
                                                                                                             
Goldberger, Esq.  Mr. Goldberger’s signature appears on the 
extension application. 
4   The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands was established 
in 2004, see Pichardo, 613 F.3d at 94, and “officially assumed 
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the Superior Court on 
January 29, 2007.”  Hypolite v. People, 51 V.I. 97, 101 (V.I. 
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things, we established a sixty-day deadline to file a certiorari 
petition, LAR 112.2(a), and made allowance for a petitioner 
to seek additional time.  Our local rule regarding extensions 
of time to file a certiorari petition provides as follows:  
A circuit judge, for good cause shown, may 
extend the time for filing a petition for writ of 
certiorari or cross-petition for a period not 
exceeding 30 days.  Any application for 
extension of time within which to file a petition 
for writ of certiorari must set out the grounds on 
which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked, 
must identify the judgment sought to be 
reviewed and have appended thereto a copy of 
the opinion, and must set forth with specificity 
the reasons justifying an extension.  An 
untimely petition for writ of certiorari must be 
accompanied by a motion for extension of time.  
However, an application for extension of time 
to file a petition for certiorari ordinarily will not 
be granted, if filed less than 5 days before the 
expiration of the time to file a petition. 
LAR 112.4(a).   
 This court has not, in a precedential decision, 
addressed the showing required to establish “good cause” for 
an extension of time to file a certiorari petition.5  Because 
                                                                                                             
2009). 
5   I am satisfied that HOVIC’s application complies with the 
remaining requirements of LAR 112.4(a).  HOVIC has 
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“good cause” is undefined in LAR 112.4(a), my undertaking 
here is to give meaning to the term.  I begin, as I must, by 
looking to the plain language of the rule.  See, e.g., In re Lord 
Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 
2009).   
 “Good cause” is understood to mean “[a] legally 
sufficient reason,” and it reflects “the burden placed on a 
litigant (usu. by court rule or order) to show why a request 
should be granted or an action excused.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 251 (9th ed. 2009).  Of course, a proffered reason 
                                                                                                             
appended a copy of the opinion sought to be reviewed and set 
forth with adequate specificity the reasons why it believes an 
extension of time should be granted.  In addition, HOVIC has 
“set out the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this court is 
invoked.”  LAR 112.4(a).  As mentioned earlier in the text, 
there is an issue as to whether the Supreme Court’s March 8 
decision is “final” and reviewable at this time.  Nevertheless, 
I do not construe LAR 112.4(a) to require a fully developed 
argument on finality in support of an application for an 
extension of time.  HOVIC’s invocation of our jurisdiction 
under § 1613, and its expression of an intent to present 
argument in the certiorari petition on whether the March 8 
decision meets the finality requirement, are enough to satisfy 
LAR 112.4(a).  In the certiorari petition itself, a petitioner is 
required to present a complete argument regarding this 
Court’s jurisdiction, including “a concise statement of the 
ground on which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked, with 
citations to applicable statutes and stating relevant facts 
establishing the finality of the order.”  LAR 112.6(a)(3). 
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or “cause” that may be legally sufficient in one context may 
not be so in another.  Federal practice is replete with rules that 
require a moving party to show “good cause,”6 but 
                                                 
6   See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“[I]f the plaintiff shows 
good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for 
service for an appropriate period.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1) 
(providing, with certain exceptions, that “[w]hen an act may 
or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for 
good cause, extend the time”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (a 
scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and 
with the judge’s consent”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“For 
good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”); Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 55(c) (court may set aside an entry of default “for 
good cause”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2) (temporary restraining 
order “expires at the time after entry -- not to exceed 14 days 
-- that the court sets, unless before that time the court, for 
good cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse party 
consents to a longer extension.”); Fed. R. App. P. 2 (“On its 
own or a party’s motion, a court of appeals may—to expedite 
its decision or for other good cause—suspend any provision 
of these rules in a particular case and order proceedings as it 
directs, except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).”); Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(5)(A) (allowing district court to extend time to 
file notice of appeal if moving party “shows excusable 
neglect or good cause”); Fed. R. App. P. 26(b) (providing, 
with certain exceptions, that “[f]or good cause, the court may 
extend the time prescribed by these rules or by its order to 
perform any act, or may permit an act to be done after that 
time expires”). 
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determining whether the showing made will justify granting 
the relief sought can be accomplished only by considering the 
specific nature and purpose of the rule at issue.  See, e.g., 
Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding 
that “there is good cause [for a protective order under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26] when a party shows that disclosure will result in a 
clearly defined, specific and serious injury but that broad 
allegations of harm are not sufficient to establish good 
cause”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 
F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that good cause to 
excuse late service under former Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j) “requires 
a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking 
an enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance 
within the time specified in the rules,” and “absence of 
prejudice alone can never constitute good cause”) (quotation 
marks omitted).  In short, the term “good cause” itself does 
not define the precise showing that we should require in the 
particular context of a party seeking more time to file a 
petition for a writ of certiorari. 
 The history behind the adoption of LAR 112.4(a), as 
reflected in the Committee Comments to the LARs, does not 
shed light on the showing required.  It appears that several 
provisions in our local rules regarding certiorari review were 
modeled after Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Local Circuit 
Rule 6-2, which established procedures for that court’s 
interim exercise of certiorari jurisdiction over the Supreme 
Court of Guam.  However, Rule 6-2, which the Ninth Circuit 
abrogated in 2005 consistent with the termination of its 
certiorari jurisdiction, see 48 U.S.C. § 1424-2 (as amended 
Oct. 30, 2004); Santos v. Guam, 436 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th 
Cir. 2006), contained no provision for seeking an extension of 
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time to file.  See 9th Cir. R. 6-2 (2004).   As such, LAR 
112.4(a) was not based on a Ninth Circuit rule that provides 
meaningful guidance for the present inquiry.  And while it 
appears that LAR 112.4(a) was modeled after the United 
States Supreme Court’s rule on extensions of time, which is 
discussed below, the Committee Comments do not expressly 
identify a specific source for the rule.7 
                                                 
7   That being said, I conclude that Rule 112.4(a) was 
modeled after the Supreme Court’s rule.  As originally 
drafted and submitted for public comment, Rule 112.4(a), 
which was proposed as “Rule 112.2(f),” provided as follows:   
 
A circuit judge, for good cause shown, may 
extend the time for filing a petition for writ of 
certiorari or cross-petition for a period not 
exceeding sixty (60) days.  Any application for 
extension of time within which to file a petition 
for writ of certiorari must set out the grounds on 
which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked, 
must identify the judgment sought to be 
reviewed and have appended thereto a copy of 
the opinion, and must set forth with specificity 
the reasons justifying an extension.  An 
application for extension of time to file a 
petition for certiorari must be submitted at least 
ten (10) days before the specified final filing 
date and will not be granted, except in the most 
extraordinary circumstances, if filed less than 
ten (10) days before that date. 
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 Lacking authority and commentary from this court as 
to the intended meaning of “good cause” in LAR 112.4(a), I 
must look elsewhere.  Fortunately, there are analogues to 
draw upon.  Courts routinely interpret and apply the good-
cause standard under rules that, like LAR 112.4(a), govern 
requests for extensions of time to act.  I find two such rules 
instructive here:  (1) the United States Supreme Court’s rule 
governing extensions of time to file for certiorari review, 
which, as noted, appears to have served as the original model 
for LAR 112.4(a); and (2) Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(5)(A), which governs motions to extend the 
time to file a notice of appeal. 
A. 
 The current Supreme Court rule regarding extensions 
of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari provides in 
relevant part as follows: 
For good cause, a Justice may extend the time 
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari for a 
period not exceeding 60 days.  An application 
to extend the time to file shall set out the basis 
for jurisdiction in this Court, identify the 
judgment sought to be reviewed, include a copy 
of the opinion and any order respecting 
rehearing, and set out specific reasons why an 
extension of time is justified.  The application 
must be filed with the Clerk at least 10 days 
                                                                                                             
This language tracked the Supreme Court rule on extensions 
of time in most respects. 
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before the date the petition is due, except in 
extraordinary circumstances. …  An application 
to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari is not favored. 
Sup. Ct. R. 13(5). 
 Rule 13(5) requires a showing of “good cause” to 
justify extending the time to seek review via certiorari – 
precisely what HOVIC must show under LAR 112.4(a).  
Thus, the Supreme Court’s treatment of Rule 13(5) is perhaps 
our best guide to understanding LAR 112.4(a).  One 
difference between these two rules does merit brief 
discussion.  The Supreme Court states in Rule 13(5) that a 
request for an extension of time “is not favored.”  In contrast, 
LAR 112.4(a) does not express general disfavor for extension 
requests, and frowns upon only eleventh-hour requests (i.e., 
requests filed less than five days before the deadline), 
explaining that those requests “ordinarily will not be 
granted.”  As noted, HOVIC’s application was filed more 
than five days before its petition was due.  Under Rule 13(5), 
the Supreme Court would appear to work from the premise 
that granting additional time to an applicant like HOVIC is 
not favored.  I apply no such presumption under LAR 
112.4(a).  Accordingly, to the extent that this difference in 
analytical approach is manifest in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of “good cause,” I do not intend by my reliance 
upon the Supreme Court’s lead to imply disfavor for 
extension requests filed in this Court more than five days 
before the petition is due.  Our rule requires only that such 
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requests be supported by “good cause.”8   
 Applications under Rule 13(5) are referred to an 
individual Justice for determination, and certain Justices have 
addressed them in published decisions, either under Rule 
13(5) or its predecessors.  For example, in Carter v. United 
States, 75 S. Ct. 911 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice 1955), 
Justice Frankfurter denied an extension of time for failure to 
show “real cause,” explaining that “[t]he nature and 
substantiality of the point in controversy emerge from the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals,” and that “[c]ounsel who 
urged the point below is counsel here; the addition of another 
counsel hardly affords ground for the desired extension.”  Id. 
at 911.  Further, while acknowledging that, “if counsel are 
actively engaged in the trial of a cause during the period 
within which a petition for certiorari must be filed, an 
appropriate extension of time might be afforded,” id., Justice 
Frankfurter observed that, in general, “the responsibility of 
counsel to litigation in this Court should take precedence,” 
                                                 
8   There are other differences between Rule 13(5) and LAR 
112.4(a).  The Supreme Court allows for a maximum sixty-
day extension of time (compared to our thirty days), and 
requires the filing of an extension request “at least 10 days 
before the date the petition is due, except in extraordinary 
circumstances.”  These additional distinctions are not 
meaningful to the analysis here, which is limited to how the 
Supreme Court has applied its good-cause standard, and, by 
analogy, the showing that this Court should require when a 
petitioner moves for an appropriate extension of time more 
than five days before the certiorari petition is due.   
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id., and “the contents of a petition for certiorari seldom call 
for the kind of research which may be demanded for a brief 
on the merits[.]” Id.   
 In Kleem v. INS, 479 U.S. 1308 (Scalia, Circuit 
Justice 1986), Justice Scalia denied an extension of time for 
failure to show good cause, observing that “counsel has given 
no reason for his request other than his desire for additional 
time to research constitutional issues.”  Id. at 1308.  Because 
“[t]he same reason could be adduced in virtually all cases … 
[i]t does not meet the standard of ‘good cause shown’ for the 
granting of a disfavored extension.”  Id.   
 In Madden v. Texas, 498 U.S. 1301 (Scalia, Circuit 
Justice 1991), Justice Scalia granted three applications for 
additional time requested by counsel representing capital 
defendants, and denied a fourth application.  He found that 
“none of these [four] applications, as an original matter, 
would meet the standard of ‘good cause shown’ for the 
granting of an extension.”  Id. at 1304.  Justice Scalia rejected 
as “unremarkable” the suggestion of one litigant’s counsel 
that more time was needed to consult with another lawyer, as 
“all petitioners can honestly claim that they would benefit 
from additional advice and consultation.”  Id.  He also 
rejected the contention that the withdrawal of appellate 
counsel would “automatically justify an extension of time,” as 
there was no indication “that the withdrawal was a reasonably 
unforeseeable occurrence.”  Id.  Further, while the “additional 
justification” of the death of counsel’s father “would in some 
circumstances qualify as ‘good cause shown,’” id., counsel in 
question had not been working on the petition and “prevented 
by the death from completing his work,” id., and there was 
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“no indication why some other attorney [from the same 
office] could not have undertaken this last-minute task, nor 
why the task has been left to the last minute.”  Id.  
Nevertheless, noting that he had not previously set forth his 
views on the good-cause standard in his capacity as Circuit 
Justice for the Fifth Circuit, Justice Scalia granted thirty-day 
extensions in three of the cases, but warned that similar 
requests would not be granted in the future.  Id. at 1305.  He 
denied more time in the fourth case on the ground that it 
would be improper to extend the period in which to file a 
certiorari petition to a date after the petitioner’s established 
execution date.  Id.   
 In Mississippi v. Turner, 498 U.S. 1306 (Scalia, 
Circuit Justice 1991), Justice Scalia denied the State’s request 
for an extension of time, explaining that “counsel’s 
overextended caseload is not ‘good cause shown’ unless it is 
the result of events unforeseen and uncontrollable by both 
counsel and client.”  Id. at 1306.  He added that, “[l]ike any 
other litigant, the State of Mississippi must choose between 
hiring more attorneys and taking fewer appeals.  Its budget 
allocations cannot, and I am sure were not expected to, alter 
this Court’s filing requirements.”  Id. at 1306-07. 
 Finally, in Penry v. Texas, 515 U.S. 1304 (Scalia, 
Circuit Justice 1995), Justice Scalia found an absence of good 
cause where counsel sought more time based on the 
voluminous record, the “breadth of errors,” and his absence 
from the office during the week before the petition was due.  
Id. at 1304.  Justice Scalia observed that “all applicants can 
honestly claim that they would benefit from additional time to 
prepare a petition for certiorari,” id. at 1305-06, and counsel’s 
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“planned absences should affect neither the degree of 
preparation afforded a client’s case nor the orderly 
administration of our deadlines.”  Id. at 1306.  
 These five decisions, four of which were authored by 
the same Justice, represent a limited survey of how the 
Supreme Court has disposed of extension requests.  Beyond 
that, I assume that other Justices have entertained requests for 
more time without publishing their views.  Nevertheless, 
useful guidance on what does and does not constitute “good 
cause” emerges from the decisions I have canvassed.  It is not 
enough for counsel to claim that s/he is too busy to meet the 
deadline, has plans to be on vacation, wants more time to 
study the record, or was only recently added to the client’s 
team of lawyers.  Such assertions, inasmuch as they turn on 
factors within the control of counsel or the client, can be 
raised in most any case and generally do not justify extending 
the deadline for certiorari review.  Rather, unforeseen or 
uncontrollable events (e.g., a death in the family, illness, or 
active engagement at trial) lie at the heart of the “good cause” 
requirement for additional time to seek certiorari.   
 I am satisfied that requiring such a showing, albeit a 
standard suggested by only a handful of cases on the 
application of Rule 13(5), is consistent with the purpose 
served by LAR 112.4(a).  Our sixty-day period in which to 
file a certiorari petition (like the ninety-day period in the 
Supreme Court, see Sup. Ct. R. 13(1)), affords an ample 
amount of time to prepare and file a petition in accordance 
with our local rules.  See LAR 112.6 (setting forth 
requirements for the contents of a certiorari petition).  This 
deadline is sufficiently generous that it ought not to be 
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extended as a routine matter, merely for the convenience of 
counsel or the petitioner.  The filing of a certiorari petition 
commences a new proceeding between the parties, much like 
the filing of a notice of appeal.  And just as extensions of the 
time to appeal are limited and exceptional, see Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(5)(A) and 26(b)(1), so too should be extensions of the 
time to seek certiorari review.  The interest in finality and 
desire to avoid needless delay that underlie our rules and 
procedures are best served by strict adherence to the sixty-day 
deadline, absent some unusual circumstance.  
 I consider this approach consistent with the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(5)(A), which provides that  
[t]he district court may extend the time to file a 
notice of appeal if:  
   (i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after 
the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires; 
and  
   (ii) regardless of whether its motion is filed 
before or during the 30 days after the time 
prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires, that party 
shows excusable neglect or good cause.  
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A).  The Committee Note to the rule 
highlights the difference between the excusable neglect and 
good cause standards, and explains the showing required for 
“good cause” to extend the time to file a notice of appeal: 
The good cause and excusable neglect standards 
19 
 
have “different domains.”  Lorenzen v. 
Employees Retirement Plan, 896 F.2d 228, 232 
(7th Cir. 1990).  They are not interchangeable, 
and one is not inclusive of the other.  The 
excusable neglect standard applies in situations 
in which there is fault; in such situations, the 
need for an extension is usually occasioned by 
something within the control of the movant.  
The good cause standard applies in situations 
in which there is no fault—excusable or 
otherwise.  In such situations, the need for an 
extension is usually occasioned by something 
that is not within the control of the movant. 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2002 Committee Note, 
Changes Made After Publication and Comments) (emphasis 
added). 
 A petition for a writ of certiorari is, for purposes of the 
present discussion, the functional equivalent of a notice of 
appeal: it initiates an appellate proceeding in this Court in the 
form of a request for discretionary review.9  While a denial of 
                                                 
9   Because a petition for a writ certiorari is the functional 
equivalent of a notice of appeal, Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 26(b) does not inform my analysis of good cause 
for extending the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari 
under LAR 112.4(a).  The plain text of Rule 26(b), which 
permits a court of appeals to extend the time prescribed by the 
Appellate Rules “to perform any act, or may permit an act to 
be done after that time expires,” explicitly states that it may 
not extend the time to file a notice of appeal, a petition for 
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certiorari review would end the matter, and thus the life of the 
proceeding potentially could be short, it is a new appellate 
proceeding nonetheless.  The good cause showing needed to 
support a request for more time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5) – 
“something that is not within the control of the movant” – fits 
the purpose of LAR 112.4(a), as well.  Any lesser 
requirement, such as granting an extension based on a mere 
showing of no prejudice to the non-moving party, would be 
inconsistent with the goal of affording more time only as a 
limited exception to the deadline for commencing a certiorari 
proceeding.   
B. 
 In light of the foregoing, I conclude that a petitioner 
seeking an extension under LAR 112.4(a) must demonstrate a 
need for more time based on an event or cause beyond the 
control of counsel or the petitioner.  This standard will help 
direct petitioners toward strict compliance with the sixty-day 
period for seeking review and ensure that extensions of the 
deadline remain the exception and not the rule.   
 HOVIC has not demonstrated good cause under this 
standard.  HOVIC notes that it recently retained an additional 
lawyer for this proceeding, and counsel contends that he 
needs more time to prepare the certiorari petition.  HOVIC 
fails, however, to point to any event beyond its control as 
having affected its ability to comply with the sixty-day 
deadline.  HOVIC itself chose to hire an additional lawyer as 
                                                                                                             
permission to appeal, a petition for review.  Fed. R. App. P. 
26(b)((1)-(2). 
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the deadline approached, and “the addition of another counsel 
hardly affords ground for the desired extension.”  Carter, 75 
S. Ct. at 911.  Further, the primary issue on which HOVIC 
intends to seek review – essentially, whether the appeal 
before the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands became moot 
when the parties agreed to settle – would not appear to require 
much study of the record by HOVIC’s newly retained 
appellate counsel.   
 While appellate counsel contends that he had other 
obligations during the week when the certiorari petition was 
due, he does not claim to have been unaware of those 
obligations well in advance, nor does it appear that he is so 
encumbered by them that requiring compliance with the 
deadline would be unreasonable.  A busy schedule, by itself, 
is not good cause for more time.  See Turner, 498 U.S. at 
1306.  HOVIC also fails to explain (i) why its counsel based 
in St. Croix could not prepare, or at least take the lead in 
preparing, the certiorari petition, (ii) why another attorney 
from appellate counsel’s office could not do so, or (iii) “why 
the task has been left to the last minute.”  Madden, 498 U.S. 
at 1304.   
 Finally, I note that the putative respondent, Mr. 
Joseph, has not opposed the application for an extension of 
time.  Assuming, arguendo, an absence of prejudice to Mr. 
Joseph, that factor would seem to weigh in HOVIC’s favor.  
It is not, however, sufficient by itself to support granting the 
requested extension.  In any event, I am unable to infer with 
certainty an absence of prejudice.  As stated, there is a 
jurisdictional question as to whether the Supreme Court’s 
decision is final and reviewable at this time.  To the extent 
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that HOVIC’s filing of a certiorari petition will commence a 
proceeding that ultimately will be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction, the filing may only delay further proceedings in 
the Superior Court, or delay consummation of the parties’ 
purported settlement.  As such, any extension of time for 
certiorari review could run counter to Mr. Joseph’s interests.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that HOVIC has 
not made a showing of good cause under LAR 112.4(a).  
Nevertheless, I will grant HOVIC’s application for a thirty-
day extension of time in light of the absence of prior guidance 
from this Court on the showing required.  See Madden, 498 
U.S. at 1305.  I do not find it unreasonable for HOVIC to 
have believed that its grounds for seeking additional time 
would suffice under the heretofore unexplained good cause 
standard of LAR 112.4(a).  HOVIC’s right to seek certiorari 
review should not be prejudiced under the circumstances.  
Accordingly, the Clerk is hereby directed to docket HOVIC’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari, with a filing date of June 8, 
2011.  Respondent, if he so chooses, may file a brief in 
opposition to the certiorari petition within thirty days of the 
date of this decision.  See LAR 112.8. 
 
